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Abstract  
Few findings in cognitive science have proved as influential as the composite face effect. 
When the top half of one face is aligned with the bottom half of another, and presented 
upright, the resulting composite arrangement induces a compelling percept of a novel facial 
configuration. Findings obtained using composite face procedures have contributed 
significantly to our understanding of holistic face processing, the detrimental effects of face 
inversion, the development of face perception, and aberrant face perception in clinical 
populations. Composite paradigms continue to advance our knowledge of face perception, as 
exemplified by their recent use for investigating the perceptual mechanisms underlying 
dynamic face processing.  However, the paradigm has been the subject of intense scrutiny, 
particularly over the last decade, and there is a growing sense that the composite face illusion, 
whilst easy to illustrate, is deceptively difficult to measure and interpret. In this review we 
provide a focussed overview of the existing composite face literature, and identify six 
priorities for future research. Addressing these gaps in our knowledge will aid the evaluation 
and refinement of theoretical accounts of the illusion.  
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1. Introduction 
In their seminal paper, Young, Hellawell and Hay (1987) presented a new ‘composite face 
paradigm’ for investigating the perception of facial configurations. The authors described 
how, when the top half of one face was aligned with the bottom half of another, the resulting 
composite arrangement induced the perception of a novel facial configuration; the presence 
of the bottom half altered the appearance of the top half, and vice versa. The illusory fusion 
of the two aligned halves hindered recognition – observers took longer to identify the source 
faces. Importantly, however, the illusion was observed only when the composite 
arrangements were aligned spatially and presented upright; free from illusion-induced 
interference, observers were able to identify the sources of upright, misaligned halves with 
comparative ease (Figure 1). When presented upside-down, observers’ recognition of the 
source faces was broadly similar in the aligned and misaligned conditions.  
 
The composite face illusion has proved enormously influential. Crucially, the effect reveals a 
tendency to integrate feature information from disparate facial regions. Findings from studies 
employing composite face techniques have therefore informed the development of holistic 
theories of face perception, which posit that local facial features are  integrated into a unified 
representation for the purposes of efficient analysis and interpretation (Farah, Wilson, Drain, 
& Tanaka, 1998; Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002; Piepers & Robbins, 2013). 
Moreover, the finding that greater illusory fusion is induced by upright arrangements 
suggests that the orientation-specific processes responsible for composite interference may 
also be disrupted in the classic face inversion effect, whereby orientation inversion 
disproportionately impairs the recognition of faces, relative to other classes of object (Yin, 
1969). 
 
The purpose of this review is to provide a focussed overview of the existing composite face 
literature with a view to identifying priorities for future research. We begin by discussing 
some of the practical issues associated with measurement (Section 2). We then consider how 
susceptibility to the illusion develops during ontogeny and the relative contribution of genetic 
and environmental factors (Section 3). In the following sections we consider the neural 
signatures associated with the illusion (Section 4), and discuss findings obtained from clinical 
populations (Section 5). Having reviewed the available empirical data on the composite face 
effect, we present and evaluate different theoretical accounts of the illusion (Section 6). We 
end the review with discussion of six priorities for future composite face research (Section 7).  
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Figure 1: When aligned with different lower halves, it is surprisingly difficult to recognise that the upper 
regions of the two composites are identical (left top). However, the illusion-induced interference is greatly 
diminished when the composites are misaligned (right top). When composite arrangements are shown upside-
down, little illusion-induced interference is seen in either the aligned (left bottom) or misaligned (right bottom) 
conditions.   
 
2. Measuring observers’ susceptibility to the illusion 
2.1 Paradigms  
In the original composite study (A. W. Young et al., 1987), participants were presented with a 
single facial composite and the degree of illusion-induced interference was inferred from 
their response latencies. When asked to identify the source of a task-relevant half (e.g., upper 
half; hereafter ‘target half’), whilst disregarding the remaining task-irrelevant half (e.g., lower 
half; hereafter ‘distractor half’), observers were disproportionately slower in the upright-
aligned condition. The application of this naming paradigm is limited, however, by the need 
to use familiar faces. To allow participants to name the source of the target half, composites 
must be constructed from personally familiar, celebrity, or otherwise learned faces. This is 
potentially problematic in light of known differences in the perceptual processing of familiar 
and unfamiliar faces (Jenkins & Burton, 2011; Murphy, Ipser, Gaigg, & Cook, 2015). For 
example, observers are better able to match familiar faces using their internal features, 
including the eyes, nose, and mouth (Osborne & Stevenage, 2008). In contrast, unfamiliar 
face matching is frequently based on external features, such as hairstyle and face shape. 
Familiar faces also place lower demands on visual working memory (Jackson & Raymond, 
2008) and are easier to detect under conditions of reduced attention, compared with 
unfamiliar faces (Jackson & Raymond, 2006).  
 
5 
 
Since the initial description of the illusion, simultaneous and delayed matching procedures 
have been developed which overcome the need to use familiar faces (i.e., that allow 
investigation of holistic processing of unfamiliar faces). Crucially, these paradigms confirm 
that arrangements constructed from unfamiliar faces also produce composite face effects. In 
simultaneous-matching paradigms, two composite arrangements – either aligned or 
misaligned, upright or inverted – are presented simultaneously and observers asked whether 
two target regions (e.g., the upper halves) are identical or not (Hole, 1994). In delayed-
matching paradigms, participants are again presented with two composite arrangements and 
asked to judge whether the target regions are identical or not. However, rather than appear 
simultaneously, the composites are presented sequentially (Goffaux & Rossion, 2006; Le 
Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2004; Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung, & Caldara, 2006). 
In a popular variant, the first composite is presented briefly (e.g., 500 ms), followed by an 
inter-stimulus-interval, typically between 500 ms and 2 seconds. Thereafter, the second 
composite is presented until the participant responds (e.g., Michel et al., 2006). In both 
matching procedures, observers’ responses are disproportionately impaired (slower and/or 
less accurate) when composite arrangements are aligned and presented upright, than when 
misaligned or inverted.  
 
2.2 Original and complete matching procedures 
In simultaneous and sequential matching paradigms, the factorial combination of target-half 
(Tsame, Tdifferent) and distractor-half (Dsame, Ddifferent) yields four possible trial types: congruent-
same (Tsame, Dsame), incongruent-same (Tsame, Ddifferent), congruent-different (Tdifferent, Ddifferent), 
incongruent-different (Tdifferent, Dsame). Note that on ‘congruent’ and ‘incongruent’ trials, 
susceptibility to the illusion therefore helps and hinders observers, respectively. Traditionally, 
researchers have employed a variant whereby distractor halves always differ, and therefore 
exert different illusory biases on the target regions (e.g., Cassia, Picozzi, Kuefner, Bricolo, & 
Turati, 2009; de Heering, Houthuys, & Rossion, 2007; Goffaux & Rossion, 2006; Konar, 
Bennett, & Sekuler, 2010; Le Grand et al., 2004; Robbins & McKone, 2007). The original 
matching procedure excludes congruent-same and incongruent-different trial types (Figure 
2a). More recently, some groups have advocated the use of so-called ‘complete design’ 
matching procedures (Figure 2b), incorporating identical and different distractor halves and 
all four trial types (e.g., Cheung, Richler, Palmeri, & Gauthier, 2008; Richler, Cheung, & 
Gauthier, 2011a; Richler, Gauthier, Wenger, & Palmeri, 2008; Richler, Mack, Palmeri, & 
Gauthier, 2011). Importantly, upright face composite effects calculated using the complete 
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and original matching designs do not correlate (Richler & Gauthier, 2014), suggesting that 
the variants measure different phenomena, however the reason for the discrepancy remains 
contested (Meinhardt, Meinhardt-Injac, & Persike, 2014; Richler & Gauthier, 2013; Rossion, 
2013). 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of the (a) original and (b) complete designs used in simultaneous and sequential matching 
paradigms. 
 
Proponents argue that, compared to the original matching procedure, the complete design 
estimates observers’ susceptibility to the composite illusion more accurately. Unlike 
estimates inferred using the complete design, composite effects measured using the original 
matching task may be influenced by differences in response bias (Richler & Gauthier, 2014). 
For example, estimates of composite interference derived from original matching designs are 
disproportionately driven by responses on incongruent-same trials where the presence of the 
different distractors makes it harder to recognise that same target halves are identical. Where 
observers have a pre-existing bias to respond ‘different’, original matching designs may 
underestimate their susceptibility to the illusion. Consistent with this view, belief 
manipulations that affect response bias distort composite effect estimates measured using the 
original matching design, but not the complete design (Richler, Cheung et al., 2011a).  
 
However, the complete design has also been criticised. Importantly, the effects of alignment 
seen in the additional congruent-same and incongruent-different trials may have a distinct 
origin to those seen in the incongruent-same and congruent-different trials included in the 
original matching design. Specifically, the facilitation seen on congruent-same trials, and the 
interference seen on incongruent-different trials, may reflect domain-general processes akin 
to response priming and response conflict, not perceptual integration (Rossion, 2013). 
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Accordingly, complete designs may be prone to strategic effects (see Section 7.2) and may be 
more likely to find effects with non-face composites (see Section 6.1); for example, 
composite effects have been observed for unfamiliar Chinese characters using this paradigm 
(Hsiao & Cottrell, 2009). A further objection relates to the predicted pattern of responses in 
the congruent-different condition. On these trials, different distractor regions are paired with 
different target regions. On some trials it is reasonable to assume that the additional different 
signal present in the distractors is fused with the physical differences between the targets, 
thereby making it easier for observers to respond ‘different’. However, where the physical 
difference between the targets is already large, it is conceivable that fusion with distractor 
regions with less obvious differences may actually dilute the difference signal, hindering 
correct responding (Robbins & McKone, 2007).   
 
2.3 Control conditions 
While different research groups employ different control conditions, the aim of these 
manipulations is consistent: to rule out simpler, generic accounts of the performance 
decrements seen when upright composites are aligned. The most commonly used control 
conditions, misalignment and inversion (see Figure 1), were introduced by Young and 
colleagues (1987). Interference is greatly reduced when composites are misaligned 
horizontally excluding the possibility that the interference is simply caused by the proximity 
of the distractor half. Transposing the position of upper and lower halves (Abbas & 
Duchaine, 2008) and presenting halves side-by-side (Richler, Tanaka, Brown, & Gauthier, 
2008) also speak against this account. Similarly, the finding that composite interference is 
greatly diminished – although not eliminated entirely (e.g., Susilo, Rezlescu, & Duchaine, 
2013) – when stimulus arrangements are shown upside-down confirms that performance 
decrements in the upright-aligned condition are not induced by the presence of the continuous 
boundary when the halves are aligned; whereas the boundary is disrupted by misalignment, it 
is preserved by inversion (Rossion, 2013). Where effects of alignment are seen for upright, 
but not inverted arrangements, authors can also exclude the possibility that the differential 
interference observed in these conditions reflects differences in the size of the spotlight of 
visuospatial attention (e.g., McKone et al., 2013). For these reasons, many consider the use of 
convergent inverted and misaligned control conditions necessary for clear interpretation of 
composite interference (McKone et al., 2013; Rossion, 2013). Finally, some investigations 
have included parallel tasks where observers judge composites constructed from non-face 
objects, including cars (Cassia et al., 2009) and dogs (Robbins & McKone, 2007). Where 
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observed, findings of face-specificity argue against the possibility that decrements in the 
upright-aligned condition reflect domain-general interference that may be produced by any 
object with a canonical orientation (e.g., Robbins & McKone, 2007). 
 
2.4 Which judgments are affected?  
In the original description of the illusion, observers were slower to name the identity of the 
faces from which target regions were sourced as a consequence of the composite interference 
(A. W. Young et al., 1987). It appears, however, that composite interference affects several 
other attributions, extending beyond facial identity. For example, viewers are slower to 
identify the emotion present in a target half, when paired with a distractor half sourced from 
the same face, but expressing a different emotion. Once again, disproportionate interference 
is seen when composite arrangements are presented upright and aligned, with little or no 
interference seen when the halves are misaligned or inverted (Calder, Young, Keane, & 
Dean, 2000; Palermo et al., 2011; Tanaka, Kaiser, Butler, & Le Grand, 2012; Wegrzyn, 
Bruckhaus, & Kissler, 2015). Composite interference also appears to bias the perception of 
facial gender and age. Observers were slower and made more errors in categorising the 
gender of target halves when composite faces were constructed using halves from different 
genders, relative to same-gender and misaligned control conditions (Baudouin & Humphreys, 
2006). Similarly, when estimating the age of composite top halves, observers’ estimates were 
biased towards the age of the bottom halves, a pattern of performance that was attenuated, but 
not eliminated, by inversion (Hole & George, 2011). Composite interference also distorts 
evaluative impressions. Top halves of upright composite faces were judged more attractive 
(Abbas & Duchaine, 2008) and trustworthy (Todorov, Loehr, & Oosterhof, 2010) when 
aligned with attractive and trustworthy bottom halves, respectively.  
 
2.5 Low-level stimulus characteristics  
Several studies have sought to investigate how observers’ susceptibility to the composite face 
illusion is affected by low-level image manipulations. For example, results obtained using the 
original matching procedure suggest that filtered composites that preserve low-spatial 
frequencies, induce stronger illusion-induced interference than high-spatial frequency 
composites (Goffaux & Rossion, 2006). While this finding is consistent with the view that 
holistic processing is supported predominantly by low-spatial frequencies (Sergent, 1986), it 
has been contested; subsequent findings obtained using the complete design have found no 
effect of spatial frequency (Cheung et al., 2008). A related suggestion is that composite 
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effects vary as a function of face size, with arrangements resembling faces viewed at ~2m 
inducing the strongest illusions when measured using the complete design (Ross & Gauthier, 
2015). Facial composites presented in grayscale have been found to induce greater composite 
interference in the original matching procedure, than composites shown in colour (Retter & 
Rossion, 2015). Interestingly, photographic negation has little effect on the strength of the 
illusion when measured using the original matching procedure; grayscale composites induce 
similar interference in positive and negative contrast polarity (Hole, George, & Dunsmore, 
1999; Taubert & Alais, 2011).  
 
3. Development  
Susceptibility to the composite face illusion appears to be present early in development. For 
example, de Heering and colleagues (2007) found that four, five and six-year-olds displayed 
similar susceptibility to each other and to adults when tested using the original matching 
procedure (see also Carey & Diamond, 1994; Mondloch, Pathman, Maurer, Le Grand, & de 
Schonen, 2007; Susilo, Crookes, McKone, & Turner, 2009). Comparable results have also 
been reported for expression composites (Durand, Gallay, Seigneuric, Robichon, & 
Baudouin, 2007). Susceptibility, however, may be present at an even younger age. Composite 
interference has been reported in 3-year-olds when tested on a simultaneous variant of the 
original matching procedure (Cassia et al., 2009). Remarkably, recent evidence from a visual 
preference paradigm indicates that infants as young as 3 months may also be susceptible to 
the illusion. When misaligned, 3-month-old infants exhibited a looking preference for 
familiar eye-regions over unfamiliar eye-regions. However, when aligned with an unfamiliar 
mouth, no systematic preference was observed (Turati, Di Giorgio, Bardi, & Simion, 2010). 
 
Early susceptibility to the composite face illusion may partly reflect a genetic contribution. 
Having tested 173 twin pairs (102 monozygotic and 71 dizygotic, age 7–19 years) using the 
original matching procedure, the correlation between the composite effects estimated for the 
monozyotic twins exceeded that seen for the dizygotic twins (Zhu et al., 2010). The authors 
estimated that genetic heritability accounted for 31% of the variance in the twins’ 
susceptibility to the illusion. As is often the case with heritable traits (e.g., Haworth et al., 
2010), the genetic influence appeared to increase with age; the variance attributable to genetic 
factors was greater in the 13-19 year–olds, than in 7-12 year-olds. No concordance was 
observed for a non-face measure of global-to-local interference based on the Navon Task 
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(Navon, 1977), suggesting that the heritability of the composite face illusion may show a 
degree of face-specificity.  
 
Complementary evidence suggests that visual experience also plays a critical role in shaping 
susceptibility to the composite face illusion. Twelve individuals (age 9-23 years) deprived of 
visual experience during the first 3-6 months of development due to bilateral congenital 
cataracts, showed little or no susceptibility to the composite face illusion when measured 
using the original matching design. Free from illusion-induced interference, these individuals 
outperformed controls when the target and distractor halves were aligned (Le Grand et al., 
2004). When tested using the original matching design, Michel and colleagues (2006) found 
that observers’ susceptibility to the composite illusion was also greater when participants 
viewed composite faces of their own race (but for conflicting results obtained with the 
complete design see Horry, Cheong, & Brewer, 2015; Zhao, Hayward, & Bülthoff, 2014). 
For a review of this literature, see Hayward, Crookes, & Rhodes, (2013). Similarly, Susilo 
and colleagues (2009) found stronger effects using the original matching procedure when 
composites were constructed from own-age faces (but see Wiese, Kachel, & Schweinberger, 
2013). However, preschool teachers (i.e. observers with extensive contact with child faces) 
failed to show an own-age effect when tested using the  original matching task; they showed 
similar composite effects for arrangements constructed from own-age faces and the faces of 
children (de Heering & Rossion, 2008). Where observed, these biases may therefore be 
products of experience.  
 
4. Neural basis 
4.1 Neural markers revealed by fMRI and EEG 
The neural representation of composite faces has been addressed using fMRI adaptation 
paradigms. These studies take advantage of the fact that repeated presentation of the same 
stimulus elicits a weaker change in the blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal, than 
presentation of two different stimuli. The same top half of a face elicits a larger response – a 
bigger release from adaptation – in the fusiform face area (FFA) when aligned with a lower 
half sourced from a different facial identity than when taken from the same face (Schiltz, 
Dricot, Goebel, & Rossion, 2010; Schiltz & Rossion, 2006). However, this difference is not 
found when the top and bottom face regions are spatially misaligned (Schiltz et al., 2010; 
Schiltz & Rossion, 2006; but see Harris & Aguirre, 2010) or when arrangements are inverted 
(Schiltz & Rossion, 2006) 
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The composite face illusion is also associated with a characteristic electroencephalography 
(EEG) signature. In comparison to aligned composite faces, consistent evidence indicates that 
misalignment elicits a delayed and enhanced N170 (Jacques & Rossion, 2009, 2010; Kuefner, 
Jacques, Prieto, & Rossion, 2010; Letourneau & Mitchell, 2008; Soria Bauser, Schriewer, & 
Suchan, 2014; Wiese et al., 2013), a response that bears striking similarity to the modulation 
elicited by face inversion (Eimer, 2000). Consistent with behavioural findings, the effect 
associated with misalignment is not observed when the composites are inverted (Jacques & 
Rossion, 2010). However, the response elicited may also depend on the stimulus attributes; a 
stronger effect of misalignment has been reported for young faces in comparison to older 
faces, regardless of participant age (Wiese et al., 2013). For aligned composite faces a larger 
N170 is also observed when sequentially presented top halves differ than when they are 
identical (Jacques & Rossion, 2009). Crucially, however, a similar increase in the N170 is 
observed when aligned distractor halves induce the illusion that two identical target halves 
differ (Jacques & Rossion, 2009; Kuefner et al., 2010). This effect is not seen with 
misaligned composites (Jacques & Rossion, 2009). 
 
4.2 Brain stimulation and neuropsychology 
Findings that illusory composite fusion can modulate FFA and N170 responses are of great 
interest. However, it is important to note that these observations are correlational. For 
example, the fMRI adaptation effects may reveal a causal role for the FFA in the emergence 
of the illusory percept, or may merely be a consequence of the illusion. The functional 
significance of these neural signatures thus remains unclear. In contrast, brain stimulation and 
neuropsychological paradigms potentially provide evidence that a particular neural substrate 
is causally involved in the experience of the illusory percept; where a region makes a 
necessary contribution to the illusion, interference in the form of stimulation or acquired 
lesion, should alter observers’ susceptibility. To date, few investigations have employed brain 
stimulation to understand the neural basis of the composite face illusion. However, a recent 
study employing the complete design found that transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS) applied to occipito-temporal cortex reduced observers’ susceptibility to the composite 
face illusion, relative to a sham condition (Yang et al., 2014; but see Renzi et al., 2015). 
 
In cases of Acquired Prosopagnosia (AP), individuals are left with face recognition 
difficulties following brain injury. To date, surprisingly few APs have been tested on 
composite face tasks. However, patients with damage to posterior (Busigny, Joubert, Felician, 
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Ceccaldi, & Rossion, 2010; Ramon, Busigny, & Rossion, 2010) or anterior (Busigny et al., 
2014) regions of the right temporal lobe have been found to exhibit reduced composite face 
effects, measured using original matching procedures, relative to matched controls. Typical 
susceptibility to the original matching procedure was reported in patient Herschel, who 
developed AP following extensive lesions predominantly in the right occipitotemporal cortex 
(Rezlescu, Pitcher, & Duchaine, 2012). When tested using the complete design, patient LR, 
an individual who developed AP following focal damage to the anterior portion of the right 
temporal lobe, exhibited a typical composite effect (Bukach, Bub, Gauthier, & Tarr, 2006). 
However, this result is qualified by an abnormal pattern of responses; specifically, the time 
taken by LR to identify the top half of the face was influenced by the bottom half in both the 
aligned and misaligned conditions, indicative of an atypical composite effect (Busigny et al., 
2014).  
 
Patient CK, who exhibited severe integrative object agnosia, showed broadly typical 
recognition of upright aligned faces; for example, CK was able to identify celebrity faces as 
well as age-matched controls, even when the identity was obscured by a disguise. However, 
CK’s recognition was drastically impaired relative to controls when upper and lower face 
halves were misaligned horizontally or when spatially aligned faces were inverted 
(Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997). Interestingly, CK’s recognition was largely 
unaffected when left and right facial halves were misaligned vertically, hinting at qualitative 
differences between the disruption induced by horizontal and vertical displacement. Because 
of the nature of CKs injury (MRI revealed no obvious circumscribed lesion), it is not possible 
to localize the sources of his impairments. Nevertheless, these results suggest that the 
neurocognitive mechanisms responsible for processing upright aligned faces dissociate from 
those mediating recognition of inverted or horizontally misaligned faces (see discussion of 
gated processing in Section 6.1).   
 
5. The susceptibility of clinical populations to the illusion 
5.1 Developmental Prosopagnosia  
Individuals with Developmental Prosopagnosia (DP) experience life-long face recognition 
difficulties, despite normal levels of intelligence and typical low-level vision (Behrmann & 
Avidan, 2005; Cook & Biotti, 2016; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006b; Susilo & Duchaine, 
2013). DPs show reduced susceptibility to both the identity (Avidan, Tanzer, & Behrmann, 
2011; Palermo et al., 2011; but see Susilo et al., 2010), and expression (Palermo et al., 2011) 
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variants of the composite face illusion, assessed using original matching procedures. 
However, DP is thought to be a heterogeneous condition (e.g., Susilo & Duchaine, 2013), and 
cases have been described who show broadly typical composite face effects on simultaneous 
variants of the original matching task (Le Grand et al., 2006). The contribution of task 
differences (e.g., simultaneous vs. sequential matching paradigms) to the discrepant findings 
remains unclear. We also note that several studies employing the original matching design 
fail to report participants’ performance on different trials (e.g., Avidan et al., 2011; Palermo 
et al., 2011). While individual differences in illusion susceptibility may be most pronounced 
in the incongruent-same condition (e.g., Le Grand et al., 2004), failure to report observers’ 
performance when targets differ (typically 50%  of trials) makes it impossible to assess the 
potential contribution of response bias to group differences, where observed.  
 
5.2 Autism Spectrum Disorder 
It has been suggested that people with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) may exhibit 
reduced susceptibility to the illusion. Observers with ASD often focus on local features and 
may therefore experience problems forming integrated global representations (Happe & Frith, 
2006). Moreover, many individuals with ASD often exhibit reduced sensitivity to illusions 
induced by contextual influence (Behrmann, Thomas, & Humphreys, 2006; Simmons et al., 
2009). Research examining composite face effects in ASD has yielded mixed results 
(Weigelt, Koldewyn, & Kanwisher, 2012). High-functioning adults with ASD showed 
broadly typical composite face effects to age- and IQ-matched controls on a sequential 
matching task (Nishimura, Rutherford, & Maurer, 2008). In contrast, a sample of adolescents 
with ASD failed to show the typical composite effect on a sequential matching task; their 
matching ability was very similar in the upright-aligned and upright-misaligned conditions 
(Teunisse & de Gelder, 2003). Whereas the foregoing studies employed the original matching 
design, Gauthier, Klaiman and Schultz (2009) found evidence of atypical composite face 
effects in a sample of adolescents with ASD using the complete design; the distractor halves 
induced similar interference in both aligned and misaligned conditions.  
 
5.3 Schizophrenia  
There is growing interest in the face recognition of observers with schizophenia. In particular 
there has been suggestion that they may exhibit reduced holistic representation (Bortolon, 
Capdevielle, & Raffard, 2015). Schwartz, Marvel, Drapalski, Rosse and Deutsch (2002) 
utilized the composite face paradigm to examine holistic processing in a sample of 19 
14 
 
medicated observers with schizophrenia. Using the naming paradigm (A. W. Young et al., 
1987), the authors found a comparable composite effect (i.e., greater composite interference 
in the aligned, than in the misaligned condition) in their clinical sample and matched controls, 
suggesting typical susceptibility to the illusion. However, in this particular investigation the 
authors utilized a misaligned control condition only; it is unclear whether the misalignment 
advantage is also seen for inverted composite arrangements (McKone et al., 2013). 
 
6. Theoretical interpretations  
Many explanations of the composite face effect appeal to the idea that upright aligned 
composites gain access to high-level face-specific processing, whereas misaligned and 
inverted composites do not. In contrast, some authors have challenged this view and have 
advanced domain-general accounts (Section 6.1). Domain-specific accounts have been 
heavily influenced by the concepts of configural and holistic representations (Section 6.2). 
However, while these ideas remain valuable theoretical heuristics, they are under-specified as 
theories in their own right (Burton, Schweinberger, Jenkins, & Kaufmann, 2015; Piepers & 
Robbins, 2013; Richler, Palmeri, & Gauthier, 2012). Drawing on the computer vision 
literature, attempts have therefore been made to provide instantiated image-processing 
accounts of the composite face illusion (Section 6.3).  
 
6.1 Domain specific vs. domain general processing 
Faces may recruit additional perceptual processing not engaged by other classes of object 
(Kanwisher, 2000; McKone, Kanwisher, & Duchaine, 2007; McKone & Robbins, 2011). 
However, employing resource-intensive processing indiscriminately is inefficient. Some 
stages of face processing may therefore be gated, whereby sophisticated domain-specific 
processing only commences once a face has been detected in the environment (Tsao & 
Livingstone, 2008). Detection of simple, proto-facial features, or ‘faciotopy’ (Henriksson, 
Mur, & Kriegeskorte, 2015), possibly mediated by subcortical visual processing, may be 
sufficient to engage more complex cortical processing (Johnson, 2005; Shah, Gaule, Bird, & 
Cook, 2013). When composite faces are aligned and presented upright, the presence of the 
intact facial arrangement may therefore permit access to face-specific processing, responsible 
for the composite illusion. Inverted or misaligned composites may lack the basic faciotopy 
necessary to gain access to the highest levels of face-specific processing, and therefore do not 
induce composite interference (Tsao & Livingstone, 2008). It is striking that these 
manipulations also disrupt the residual face recognition ability seen in patient CK (see 
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Section 4.2). Potential accounts of this high-level face processing are described in the 
following sections (see Sections 6.2 and 6.3). 
 
In contrast, some authors reject the idea that the composite-face illusion is a product of face-
specific representation mechanisms; rather, they argue that composite interference reflects a 
form of automatic processing recruited by ‘objects of expertise’. Objects of expertise are 
categories of objects i) with which the observer has extensive visual experience, and ii) 
comprising exemplars that share a common prototypical feature arrangement. Thus, birds 
(Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000) and dogs (Diamond & Carey, 1986) may be 
objects of expertise for ornithologists and dog show judges, respectively. Following extensive 
experience individuating exemplars, observers are thought to process the separate features of 
objects of expertise as a unified whole (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Richler et al., 2012; 
Richler, Wong, & Gauthier, 2011; A. C. Wong, Palmeri, & Gauthier, 2009).  
 
Consistent with this domain-general account, composite effects obtained using the complete 
design have been reported for non-face objects of expertise encountered naturally, including 
cars (Bukach, Phillips, & Gauthier, 2010; Gauthier, Curran, Curby, & Collins, 2003), words 
(A. C.  Wong et al., 2011), Chinese characters (A. C. Wong et al., 2012), and chess boards 
(Boggan, Bartlett, & Krawczyk, 2012). Similar composite effects have been reported with 
synthetic non-face objects, including ‘Greebles’ (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; Gauthier, Williams, 
Tarr, & Tanaka, 1998) and ‘Ziggerins’ (A. C. Wong et al., 2009), where expertise is acquired 
through lab-based training. Crucially, the type of training administered appears to modulate 
illusion susceptibility. Participants who received individuation training – naming particular 
exemplars – exhibited greater composite effects than those who received categorisation 
training – judging which group a given exemplar belonged to (A. C. Wong et al., 2009). 
There have been relatively few reports of composite effects for non-face objects obtained 
using the original matching procedure. For example, Robbins and McKone (2007) failed to 
find a composite effect when dog experts were presented with arrangements constructed from 
dog stimuli. Similarly, Greeble experts failed to show composite effects for Greebles 
(Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; Gauthier et al., 1998). Recently, however, a study found evidence of 
composite effects for body postures using the original procedure (Willems, Vrancken, 
Germeys, & Verfaillie, 2014), possibly reflecting similarities in the way that faces and bodies 
are processed (Minnebusch & Daum, 2009; see Section 7.4). 
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6.2 Configural and holistic processing 
It has been widely suggested that upright faces may recruit a rapid parallel analysis of the 
whole face. The terms ‘holistic’ and ‘configural’ are often used interchangeably to describe 
this whole-face processing, leading to some confusion in the literature (e.g., Piepers & 
Robbins, 2013). However, two broadly distinct accounts may be delineated.  
 
Faces are defined by the presence and prototypical arrangement of certain basic features; i.e., 
two eyes above a nose and mouth, so-called first-order relations. Because all faces share this 
common arrangement, the spatial distances between internal features, so-called second-order 
relations, may be particularly important for the recognition of individual faces (Diamond & 
Carey, 1986). The processing of these second-order relations has been commonly termed 
‘configural’ processing. It is possible that the composite face illusion alters configural 
processing; for example, when composite faces are presented upright and aligned, observers 
may perceive a novel configuration that hinders recognition of the constituent parts 
(Hancock, Burton, & Bruce, 1996; A. W. Young et al., 1987). Consistent with this 
interpretation, observers’ ability to discriminate faces that share common features and differ 
only in their spatial arrangement (e.g., eyes close together or far apart), is greatly diminished 
when stimuli are inverted (Barton, Keenan, & Bass, 2001; Freire, Lee, & Symons, 2000; 
Goffaux & Rossion, 2006; Haig, 1984; Leder & Bruce, 2000; Leder, Candrian, Huber, & 
Bruce, 2001; Rhodes, Brake, & Atkinson, 1993; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996).  
 
Alternatively, variation in feature shape and the spatial relations may be described within a 
single non-decomposable holistic representation – a ‘Gestalt’ that cannot be broken down 
into its constituent parts or the inter-relations between them (Farah et al., 1998). Because 
different distractor regions induce the modelling of a new face Gestalt, they alter the 
appearance of the target half. This view accords with recent findings that the composite face 
illusion alters observers’ perception of feature shape as well as feature configurations 
(Hayward, Crookes, Chu, Favelle, & Rhodes, 2016). This holistic account is also consistent 
with the part-whole effect, whereby individual features are judged more accurately in the 
context of an upright face than when shown in isolation, despite the context remaining 
uninformative (Tanaka & Farah, 1993). Interestingly, this contextual advantage disappears 
when stimulus arrangements are shown upside-down. Similarly, individuals’ ability to 
discriminate exemplars that differ only in terms of i) their features or ii) their inter-feature 
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spacing, are highly-correlated for upright faces, but not for inverted faces or non-face objects 
(Yovel & Kanwisher, 2008).  
 
In an attempt to reconcile these views, it has been proposed that holistic, configural, and 
piecemeal (‘parts-based’) processing, are points on a processing continuum defined by degree 
of feature integration (Reed, Stone, Grubb, & McGoldrick, 2006). However, the distinction 
between holistic and configural processing remains contentious. Changing the spatial 
relations between features necessarily changes the Gestalt representation hypothesised by the 
holistic account. The distinction between the accounts therefore relies on the assumption that 
feature shape may be changed independently of the spatial relations between the features. 
While this view is accepted by some authors (Farah et al., 1998; Yovel & Kanwisher, 2008), 
it is disputed by others on the ground that changing local contour and shading cues also 
changes the configural relations between features (Hancock et al., 1996; McKone & Yovel, 
2009; Piepers & Robbins, 2013). 
 
6.3 Image processing models 
According to the Gabor jet model (Biederman & Kalocsais, 1997; Wiskott, Fellous, Kuiger, 
& Von Der Malsburg, 1997), faces are described by columns of multi-scale, multi-orientation 
filters (Figure 3a), with their receptive fields centered on facial landmarks defined relative to 
the first-order features (Figure 3b). The model retains biological plausibility, insofar as a 
Gabor jet approximates the multiscale, multiorientation tuning properties of cells in a V1 
hypercolumn (De Valois & De Valois, 1988). For a given face, a Gabor jet centered on the 
left pupil, with different filters for eight orientations and five scales would yield 40-item 
vectors describing the contrast variation around the left eye (Figure 3c). Face recognition is 
achieved by comparing the combined readout from all of the Gabor jets, with stored 
templates for known faces. Importantly, variation in one part of the face will affect kernels 
with medium and large receptive fields centered on other parts of the face (Xu, Biederman, & 
Shah, 2014). Where aligned composite faces are shown upright, image variation present in 
the lower face half will therefore alter the readout of Gabor Jets centered on features in the 
upper half, biasing observers’ perception of its identity (Herald, Shah, Xu, Biederman, & 
Juarez, 2015).  
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Figure 3: (a) Illustration of a Gabor Jet, comprising different multi-scale, multi-orientation filters. (b) The 
receptive fields of the filters in a particular Gabor Jet are centered on a particular facial landmark. The receptive 
fields of the intermediate and larger scale filters overlap and cover wide areas of the face. (c) Gabor jets 
comprising n filters yield a vector of n items describing the contrast variation at the particular facial landmark 
sampled by the Gabor Jet.  
 
There has also been interest in the utility of unsupervised data reduction algorithms as models 
of human face perception. Following an initial pre-processing stage – input images are 
typically cropped to a common aspect ratio and faces aligned using sets of fiducial points – 
algorithms are able to extract dimensions that describe the variation within a set of input 
images. To date, many authors have used Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to illustrate 
the value of this approach (Calder, 2011; Calder, Burton, Miller, Young, & Akamatsu, 2001; 
Calder & Young, 2005; Hancock et al., 1996). When applied to faces, PCA returns the n 
Eigenface dimensions (whole face components that may be combined linearly to reconstruct a 
given facial exemplar) that most effectively describe the variation present within the set of 
sampled images (Turk & Pentland, 1991). Thereafter, facial exemplars are represented as 
vectors in the facespace defined by the n Eigenface dimensions. Importantly, where PCA is 
applied only to intact, naturalistic faces, components will reflect the natural covariation 
present in different face halves; for example, happy and angry mouth regions will have been 
encountered in the presence of accompanying happy and angry eye-regions. Unless the 
algorithm encounters faces with different emotion signals in their top and bottom halves, the 
resulting PCA space will lack the dimensionality with which to represent mixed-emotion 
composites (Cottrell, Branson, & Calder, 2002). The illusion-induced interference first 
reported by Calder et al., (2000) may therefore reflect the process of modelling emotion-
19 
 
incongruent composites within an emotion-congruent face-space. By appealing to the same 
logic, PCA models can explain other types of composite binding such as that seen for age and 
gender (see Section 2.4). Many of the principles and predictions derived from PCA models 
generalize well to other data reduction algorithms, notably Architecture II Independent 
Components Analysis (ICA; Bartlett, Movellan, & Sejnowski, 2002; Calder & Young, 2005; 
Nestor, Plaut, & Behrmann, 2013).  
 
7. Future directions 
In the foregoing sections, we have reviewed the body of empirical findings reported with 
composite paradigms and existing theoretical accounts of the illusion. In this section, we look 
forward, highlighting priorities for future research. In particular, several critical questions 
remain unresolved. These gaps in our knowledge undermine attempts to evaluate and refine 
theoretical accounts of the composite face illusion.  
 
7.1 The functional significance of the composite face illusion  
The view that holistic representation, as measured by the composite face illusion, is causally 
related to face recognition ability remains extremely popular; for example, holistic processing 
may permit accurate and efficient representation (Maurer et al., 2002; Piepers & Robbins, 
2013). However, the functional significance of the composite face illusion remains uncertain. 
First, the literature is inconsistent with respect to the relationship between individuals’ 
susceptibility to the composite face illusion and other markers of holistic representation, 
including the part-whole (Tanaka & Farah, 1993) and face-inversion (Yin, 1969) effects. 
Whilst some authors have found associations between these measures using the complete 
design (DeGutis, Wilmer, Mercado, & Cohan, 2013), others using the original matching 
procedure have not (Durand et al., 2007; Wang, Li, Fang, Tian, & Liu, 2012). For example, 
Wang and colleagues (2012) found susceptibility to the composite and part-whole effects 
were unrelated. Second, studies comparing observers’ susceptibility to the composite face 
illusion and face recognition ability have also yielded equivocal results; whilst some studies 
have found little or no correlation using the original matching procedure (de Heering & 
Maurer, 2014; Konar et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2012), other authors have observed 
associations with ability using the complete (DeGutis et al., 2013) and original procedures 
(Avidan et al., 2011). It is likely that differences between the composite tasks used (e.g., 
Richler, Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011b), their analyses (e.g., DeGutis et al., 2013), the 
sensitivity of face recognition measures (e.g., Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006a), and sample 
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composition (e.g., Avidan et al., 2011), all contribute to the discrepant findings. It is 
imperative that future research teases apart these sources of variation to understand the 
functional significance of the illusion.    
 
7.2 Strategic and contextual influences 
The composite face illusion is frequently attributed to automatic holistic processing – either 
mediated by face-specific mechanisms or a product of perceptual expertise (see Section 6). 
Importantly, however, several results suggest that strategic and contextual factors influence 
susceptibility to the illusion. For example, Navon priming manipulations that bias observers’ 
attention towards global form increase susceptibility to the composite-face illusion measured 
using the complete design (Gao, Flevaris, Robertson, & Bentin, 2011). Conversely, induction 
of negative mood (Curby, Johnson, & Tyson, 2012) and the presence of unrelated observers 
(Garcia-Marques, Fernandes, Fonseca, & Prada, 2015), were found to decrease illusion 
susceptibility when measured using the original matching procedure. In a study employing 
the complete design, greater distractor interference was observed for composites made from 
unfamiliar non-face objects when trials were preceded by an aligned composite face (Richler, 
Bukach, & Gauthier, 2009). Aligned composites also induce more interference when 
preceded by misaligned composites – possibly reflecting the creation of a larger ‘attentional 
window’ that biases subsequent perceptual processing – than when preceded by aligned 
composites (Richler et al., 2009). Where observed, composite effects for unfamiliar non-face 
objects (e.g., Hsiao & Cottrell, 2009), may be a product of contextual and strategic 
influences, whereas composite effects observed with objects-of-expertise, including faces, 
may be the product of increasingly automatic holistic processing (Richler, Wong et al., 2011). 
Understanding how strategic and contextual factors influence performance on composite 
paradigms will inform investigation into the perceptual origins of the illusion (Richler, 
Cheung et al., 2011a; Rossion, 2013). 
 
7.3 Top-down or bottom up? 
There is growing interest in how flexible strategic factors, including attention and response 
base-rates, can affect the size of composite face effects (Section 7.2). A related question is the 
extent to which the illusion itself is a product of ‘bottom-up’ feed-forward processing of 
upright aligned composite arrangements, or a ‘top-down’ interpretation imposed on a sensory 
description (see Gregory, 1997). Several theoretical approaches, including the Gabor Jet (Xu 
et al., 2014) and PCA accounts (Cottrell et al., 2002), model composite interference as an 
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emergent property of feed-forward descriptive processes. Alternatively, however, the 
composite illusion may be a product of a top-down modelling process. The goal of visual 
perception is to infer the causes of sensory input; percepts can be thought of as inferences 
from sensory data and knowledge derived from the past (Friston, 2005; Gregory, 1997; 
Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004). The generative models we have acquired for faces will 
likely reflect the whole-face covariation we experience during the course of our lives. These 
whole-face models will aid perception of ambiguous forms or expressions under typical 
conditions, but will tend to generate holistic illusions when inputs come from different faces. 
 
 
Figure 4: Compelling demonstrations of the composite illusion can be provided using highly abstract cartoon-
face stimuli. In the upright-aligned condition (left), the presence of the difference mouths makes it harder to 
recognise that the eyes are the same. The illusion is diminished in the misaligned (middle) and inverted (right) 
conditions.  
 
While little attempt has been made to distinguish these possibilities, several lines of evidence 
suggest that a top-down account is plausible. For example, should the composite illusion be 
an emergent property of feed-forward processing, some degree of illusory bias might be 
expected where distractor regions are masked and fail to reach conscious awareness. 
However, studies employing continuous flash suppression suggest that distractor face regions 
do not induce illusory bias when presented outside of conscious awareness (Axelrod & Rees, 
2015). Conversely, when observers are consciously aware of stimulus arrangements, a 
surprising array of stimuli successfully elicit the composite illusion. For example, 
photographic negation drastically distorts the appearance of faces (Galper, 1970); in 
particular, the inversion of shape-from-shading cues, whereby patterns of shading are used to 
infer three dimensional form, give negated faces a grotesque appearance (Kemp, Pike, White, 
& Musselman, 1996). While this manipulation might be expected to severely hamper feed-
forward processing, studies employing the original matching paradigm suggest that 
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arrangements shown in typical polarity and photographic negative induce broadly similar 
composite effects (Hole et al., 1999; Taubert & Alais, 2011). Similarly, compelling 
demonstrations of the composite illusion can be achieved using abstract cartoon faces (Figure 
4). While cartoon and naturalistic faces may share conceptual characteristics, they bear little 
physical resemblance. Knowledge about faces therefore appears to modulate the composite 
face illusion in the absence of typical appearance.  
 
 
7.4 Not all facial composites are created equal 
While considerable research has addressed differences in individuals’ susceptibility to the 
composite face illusion (Avidan et al., 2011; DeGutis et al., 2013; Richler, Cheung et al., 
2011b; Wang et al., 2012), there is a paucity of research examining inter-stimulus 
differences. While it is recognised that some facial composites induce stronger illusion-
induced interference than others (e.g., Richler & Gauthier, 2014; Ross, Richler, & Gauthier, 
2015), little explanation has been offered for these differences. A better understanding of 
these differences might inform theoretical accounts; for example, it will be interesting to see 
whether image processing approaches (e.g. Gabor Jet and PCA accounts; see Section 6.3) can 
model this inter-stimulus variability. Moreover, an appreciation of inter-stimulus-variability 
may help disambiguate some of the equivocal aspects of the literature (e.g., the functional 
significance of the illusion, findings from clinical populations). Some of the variability may 
reflect low-level image differences including image scale, spatial frequency and colour 
information (see Section 2.5). Differences in shape and texture variation may also be 
important. For example, in original matching paradigms, distractors with incongruent shape 
but congruent texture exert more influence on a target region, than distractors with 
incongruent texture but congruent shape (Jiang, Blanz, & Rossion, 2011).  
 
A further possibility is that observers are detecting emotion cues in some of the ostensibly 
‘neutral’ faces used to construct facial composites (Figure 5). When posing for photos, actors 
seeking to appear neutral may appear anxious or bored. Moreover, it is not always easy to 
distinguish a stranger’s permanent facial shape from their transient facial expressions; e.g., 
whether an unfamiliar actor is scowling or simply has narrow eyes (e.g., Todorov, Said, 
Engell, & Oosterhof, 2008). Crucially, observers may therefore perceive emotion where 
actors do not intend to convey emotion. It is well established that facial emotions induce 
strong composite effects (Calder et al., 2000; Palermo et al., 2011; Tanaka et al., 2012). 
Facial composites rich in perceived emotion cues may therefore induce stronger composite 
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effects when observers are asked to judge whether target regions are, or are not identical 
(e.g., in original or complete matching paradigms). Interestingly, gaze direction – known to 
modulate the perception of facial emotion; for example direct gaze makes expressions appear 
angrier (Adams & Kleck, 2003, 2005) – has been found to influence the magnitude of 
composite effects measured using the original matching design (S. G. Young, Slepian, 
Wilson, & Hugenberg, 2014). We also note that a study employing the original matching 
procedure recently found composite effects with expressive body postures (Willems et al., 
2014), suggestive of holistic coding of body posture. In contrast, authors have failed to 
observe composite effects with neutral bodies (e.g., Soria Bauser, Suchan, & Daum, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 5: Examples of facial composites taken from a commonly used stimulus set developed by Le Grand et al. 
(2004). While the composites are constructed with ostensibly neutral faces, subtle emotion cues are present in 
many of the faces.   
 
 
7.5 The nature of holistic information representation  
The composite face illusion is frequently attributed to whole-face processing (see Section 
6.1). However, surprisingly little is known about the nature of the integrated representations 
derived from this analysis. At least two lines of evidence suggest that current ‘holistic’ and 
‘configural’ accounts may be under-specified. First, observers’ face recognition is 
surprisingly insensitive to vertical and horizontal stretching; for example observers can easily 
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recognise faces stretched to twice their true height (Hole, George, Eaves, & Rasek, 2002). 
Whole-face processing is thought to mediate accurate and efficient description of the spatial 
relationships between features (see Rossion, 2008). However, such findings suggest that 
spatial relations may be coded relatively – for example, the height of one feature may be 
described through reference to the height of another – not through absolute metrics – where 
horizontal and vertical distances are measured in units akin to degrees of visual angle (Burton 
et al., 2015). Second, recent findings suggest that, in comparison to vertical information, the 
horizontal information structure of faces contributes disproportionately to face recognition 
(Dakin & Watt, 2009) and is disproportionately sensitive to orientation inversion (Goffaux & 
Dakin, 2010). These findings raise the possibility that holistic representations may be 
dominated by horizontal information. Composite face paradigms may offer researchers a way 
to test these hypotheses.   
 
7.6 Dynamic Face Processing  
While the overwhelming majority of existing research has examined the composite face 
illusion using static faces, the faces we typically encounter outside of the lab are moving 
(O'Toole, Roark, & Abdi, 2002). A recent study employing the naming paradigm found that 
the presence of an aligned dynamic distractor impairs identification of dynamic target halves, 
learned beforehand (Favelle, Tobin, Piepers, Burke, & Robbins, 2015). Importantly, 
composite interference is diminished when the dynamic halves are misaligned or presented 
upside-down. Similarly, when asked to judge the speed of eye opening and closing 
movements, the presence of task-irrelevant mouth opening and closing induces illusory 
slowing of the eye changes (Cook, Aichelburg, & Johnston, 2015). Interestingly, this illusion-
induced interference is only seen in upright dynamic faces, at particular relative-phase 
relationships. Whereas static composite effects are disrupted by spatial misalignment, phase-
specificity suggests that dynamic integration may be sensitive to temporospatial alignment.  
 
It is important that future research addresses the relationship between composite interference 
seen with dynamic faces and the recognition of moving faces. The presence of motion cues 
often improves facial recognition (Knight & Johnston, 1997; Lander, Christie, & Bruce, 
1999). However, observers’ ability to use motion cues is sensitive to orientation, suggestive 
of holistic or configural representation (Hill & Johnston, 2001; Knight & Johnston, 1997). 
Interestingly, observers with ASD are relatively poor at recognising individuals’ facial 
motion signature (O'Brien, Spencer, Girges, Johnston, & Hill, 2014) and show little or no 
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susceptibility to the illusory slowing induced by dynamic cross-feature interactions (Shah, 
Bird, & Cook, 2016). Moreover, the relationship between the dynamic and static composites 
remains unclear; while both illusions exhibit sensitivity to alignment and orientation, it is 
uncertain whether they are products of common processes or representations.  
 
8. Conclusion 
Results obtained from composite face procedures have contributed significantly to our 
understanding of holistic face processing, the detrimental effects of inversion, and aberrant 
face perception in clinical populations. The ongoing value of the paradigm is illustrated by its 
recent application to investigate dynamic face processing. However, composite procedures 
have been the subject of intense scrutiny, particularly over the last decade, and there is a 
growing sense that the composite face illusion, whilst easy to illustrate, is deceptively 
difficult to measure and interpret. Considerable debate has focussed on the use of original and 
complete designs (Richler & Gauthier, 2014; Richler et al., 2012; Rossion, 2013), control 
conditions (McKone et al., 2013), the analyses employed (DeGutis et al., 2013), and the 
effects of strategic and contextual factors (Richler, Wong et al., 2011). We have suggested 
that inter-stimulus variability may also affect the susceptibility estimates obtained by 
different authors and warrants greater consideration. Despite overarching disagreements on 
how to refine the paradigm, the composite face effect remains a compelling and fascinating 
visual illusion. As a tool, it still holds much potential in our investigation of how faces and 
other objects of expertise are processed.  
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